1. Alcoff, Linda Martin (2017), “Eurocentrism as an Epistemology of Ignorance”, In: The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, Pp: 397-408.
2. Caruso, Gregg, (2018), “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/>.
3. Clover, Louise Margaret, (2018), Reasons and Blame: On the Conflict between Reasons Internlise and Blameworthiness (Master's thesis).
4. Coates, D. Justin, & Tognazzini, Neal, (2012), “The Nature and Ethics of Blame”, Philosophy Compass, 7(3), Pp: 197-207.
5. Eshleman, Andrew, (2016), “Moral Responsibility”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-responsibility/>.
6. Heidelberg, Roy L., (2017), “Political accountability and Spaces of Contestation”, Administration & Society, 49(10), Pp: 1379-1402.
7. Levy, Neal, (2011), Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free will and Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press on Demand.
8. McKenna, Michael, (2012), Conversation & Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin,(2018),“Compatibilism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/compatibilism/>.
10. Nelkin, Dana K., (2015), “Psychopaths, Incorrigible Racists, and the Faces of Responsibility”, Ethics, 125(2), Pp: 357-390.
11. Pereboom, Derk, (2006), Living without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. ________, (2014), Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Nichols, Shaun, (2007), “After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1), Pp: 405-428.
14. Russell, Paul, & McKenna, Michael, (Eds.), (2012), Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on PF Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
15. Scanlon, T. M., (1998), What We Owe to Each other, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
16. ______, (2008), Moral Dimensions, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
17. _______, (2015), “Forms and Conditions of Responsibility”, The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, Pp: 89-114.
18. Shoemaker, David, (2013), “Qualities of Will”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 30(1-2), 95-120.
19. Smith, Angela, (2015), “Responsibility as Answerability”, Inquiry, 58(2), Pp. 99-126.
20. Snowdon, Paul and Gomes, Anil, (2019), “Peter Frederick Strawson”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/strawson/>.
21. Strawson, Galen, (2015), “The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility?”, Philosophy of Action: An Anthology, Pp. 40, 373.
22. Strawson, P. F., (1962), “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, Pp. 1–25, Reprinted in Strawson, P. F. (2008), Freedom and Resentment and other Essays, Routledge.
23. Talbert, Matthew, (2008), “Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89(4), Pp. 516-535.
24. Tognazzini, Neal and Coates, D. Justin, (2018), “Blame”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/blame/>.
25. Wallace, R. Jay, (2011), “Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments”, in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of TM Scanlon, Pp. 348–372.
26. Watson, Gary, (1987), “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian theme”, In: Free Will and Reactive Attitudes, Routledge, Pp. 127-154.
27. ______, (1996), “Two Faces of Responsibility”, Philosophical Topics, 24(2), Pp. 227-248.
28. ______, (2011), “The Trouble with Psychopaths”, In: Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of TM Scanlon, Pp. 307-331.
29. ______, (2019), “Transcript of an Interview with Gary Watson”, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5: Themes from the Philosophy of Gary Watson 5, Pp. 240-258.
30. Wolf, S., (2011), “Blame, Italian Style”, In: Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of TM Scanlon, Pp. 332–34