Mental Existence in Sadrian Philosophy: Stronger or Weaker? An Analysis of Its Foundations and Implications

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. student in Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Wisdom, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran.

2 Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran.

3 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Wisdom, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran.

Abstract

The distinction between mental and external existence is among the classical categorizations of being in Islamic philosophy. External existence is defined as that in which the quiddity  of an object appears together with its effects, while mental existence is the presence of a quiddity without its external effects. The present study examines whether mental existence is stronger or weaker than external existence. Since mental forms are entirely immaterial, the assumption that mental existence is stronger gains initial plausibility. Yet, as mental existence is tied to the “aspect of non-entailment of effects,” it also appears weaker. This paper first investigates the strength or weakness of mental existence independently of Mulla Sadra’s views and then analyzes the issue based on his philosophy. Through a detailed examination of the nature of both mental and external existence, and by presenting several arguments, the study explores Sadra’s two distinct approaches regarding this question. The analysis demonstrates that, ultimately, Mulla Sadra explicitly inclines toward the superiority of mental existence. The paper concludes by critically assessing this claim and reconstructing the reasoning that challenges the supposed strength of mental existence within the Sadrian system.

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References

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