https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/ Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University en daily 1 Tue, 21 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0330 Tue, 21 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0330 https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8582.html The present study focuses on the problem of the nature of mental images and seeks to clarify the relationship between the theory of H. H. Price and the explanations offered within Hikmat al-Mutaʿāliyah, particularly in the thought of Mulla Ṣadrā. It further evaluates the capacity of these two frameworks to interpret parapsychological phenomena such as telepathy, hauntings (or place-possession), and psychokinesis. The primary aim of the research is to identify points of convergence and divergence between the two approaches and to demonstrate the possibility of their mutual complementarity within a more comprehensive theoretical framework.The study adopts a descriptive–analytical and comparative methodology. First, the methodological and ontological foundations of each perspective are reconstructed—namely, Price’s empiricism grounded in parapsychological evidence, and the rational–ontological argumentation characteristic of Hikmat al-Mutaʿāliyah. Subsequently, the principal components of their respective accounts of mental images are comparatively analyzed, including their intermediary status between matter and immateriality, persistence and vitality, symbolic expression, and the possibility of communication with other minds.The findings indicate that both theories regard mental images as neither purely material nor merely subjective, but as possessing an intermediate ontological status. However, Price tends toward attributing a degree of relative independence to images and assigns properties such as a “telepathic character” to the ideas themselves. In contrast, Hikmat al-Mutaʿāliyah grounds such properties in the existential modalities (tashaʾunāt) of the soul and its hierarchical levels of being. The study concludes that a rereading of Price’s theory in light of Ṣadrian metaphysical principles may enhance its metaphysical coherence while preserving its responsiveness to the empirical data emphasized by Price. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8564.html The position of the Perfect Man in Sayyid Haydar Amuli’s thought has predominantly been studied through ontological lenses, while its methodological function in text comprehension remains less explored. This research employs a descriptive-analytical approach to explain how the concept of the Perfect Man transforms from a subject of knowledge into a condition for the possibility of understanding within Amuli’s inward interpretation of the Quran. Findings indicate that by linking the interpreter's ontological stages with the inward layers of revelation, Amuli perceives understanding not as a merely linguistic act, but as an ontological event based on the correspondence between the cosmic and written realms. In this reading, the Perfect Man, as the Speaking Quran, serves as the sole channel for transcending literal surfaces and penetrating the text's depths. The research innovation lies in demonstrating that in Amuli’s wilayi hermeneutics, the interpreter's role is not a transcendental position relative to the text; instead, it is a station where the interpreter and the Quran attain unity within the oneness of the Muhammadan Reality. Consequently, valid interpretation arises from this ontological bond and the interpreter’s reflective capacity toward the truths hidden in the divine word, preventing stagnation at the literal level. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8670.html The distinction between mental and external existence is among the classical categorizations of being in Islamic philosophy. External existence is defined as that in which the quiddity  of an object appears together with its effects, while mental existence is the presence of a quiddity without its external effects. The present study examines whether mental existence is stronger or weaker than external existence. Since mental forms are entirely immaterial, the assumption that mental existence is stronger gains initial plausibility. Yet, as mental existence is tied to the “aspect of non-entailment of effects,” it also appears weaker. This paper first investigates the strength or weakness of mental existence independently of Mulla Sadra’s views and then analyzes the issue based on his philosophy. Through a detailed examination of the nature of both mental and external existence, and by presenting several arguments, the study explores Sadra’s two distinct approaches regarding this question. The analysis demonstrates that, ultimately, Mulla Sadra explicitly inclines toward the superiority of mental existence. The paper concludes by critically assessing this claim and reconstructing the reasoning that challenges the supposed strength of mental existence within the Sadrian system. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8664.html bdullah ibn al-Muqaffa is one of the first Muslim thinkers to have worked in the compilation and translation of works related to practical wisdom. Practical wisdom in Ibn al-Muqaffa's intellectual system means the phronesis or products of practical reason in the field of applying the general rules of voluntary action to its particular instances. The main lines of Ibn al-Muqaffa's thought in this area are: attention to the educational aspect of wisdom, emphasis on the position of reason, attention to religion and its unique role in individual and social happiness, special attention to civil politics, individual and social ethics. These general lines of thought can be seen prominently in Ibn al-Muqaffa's translation of Kalila and Dimna. In the following work, the essence of practical wisdom from Ibn al-Muqaffa's point of view is explained in a descriptive manner, and then the general lines of Ibn al-Muqaffa's thought in the field of practical wisdom are categorized, and finally, these general lines are applied to the main stories of Kalila and Dimna. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8646.html Divine foreknowledge is one of the most significant and complex issues in theology. How did God, the Exalted, have knowledge of things prior to creation? Did He possess knowledge through imprinted forms (suwar murtasimah), or through acquired knowledge (ʿilm ḥuṣūlī), or through presentational knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī)? Or, as some believe, should such knowledge be denied altogether? Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī critiques the Peripatetic view on divine foreknowledge on five key points. On the other hand, Mullā Ṣadrā, though disagreeing with the Peripatetic position and offering his own theory on the matter, has responded to all of Ṭūsī’s objections. Using an analytical-logical method, this study re-examines and evaluates all five of Ṭūsī’s critiques in terms of their foundational and structural aspects. The main objective of this paper is to analyze Ṭūsī’s criticisms of Avicenna’s theory of divine foreknowledge. It will further be shown that Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of divine foreknowledge — known as “detailed knowledge within the very mode of indistinct comprehension” (al-ʿilm al-ijmālī fī ʿayn al-kashf al-tafṣīlī) — is, in its foundations, partially adopted from certain principles upheld by Ṭūsī. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8616.html This research conducts a systematic reconstruction and critical analysis of Allameh Tabatabai's definition of a miracle, based on his primary work, I'jaz az Nazar-i 'Aql va Qur'an. A review of the existing literature reveals that most studies have relied on secondary sources and lack a coherent analytical framework for representing the internal logic of Allameh's thought, thus necessitating a direct examination of this foundational text. The central problem is to evaluate the comprehensiveness and exclusiveness of this definition, focusing on the two core components of "khariq-i 'adat" (breaking of natural custom) and "tahaddi" (challenge), which is investigated through thematic content analysis. The findings indicate that Allameh Tabatabai explains the "breaking of natural custom" not in opposition to the principle of causality, but within the framework of divine will as the absolute cause that supersedes material causes. However, this explanation lacks empirical criteria to distinguish a miracle from unknown natural phenomena. The component of "tahaddi" is presented as a necessary condition and a distinguishing feature, yet this stipulation compromises the definition's comprehensiveness by excluding some miracles from its scope. Moreover, the absence of objective criteria for judgment renders it an unfalsifiable, faith-based proposition. Overall, although 'Allamah Tabataba’i’s approach possesses internal consistency from a theological perspective, the proposed definition lacks the necessary methodological inclusiveness and exclusiveness. Ultimately, the study suggests that to overcome this challenge, the conception of tahaddi (challenge) must be conceptually expanded and elevated from a mere linguistic contest to an ‘epistemological contrast between the Creator’s infinite knowledge and the creature’s finite capability. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8672.html In the wisdom 470 of Nahj al-Balaghah, a question about Towhid was posed to Imam Ali (peace be upon him); the Imam, in a brief and profound answer, establishes a connection between “Towhid” and “Not conceiving God through imagination.” This present research, using an analytical‑descriptive method and relying on the foundations of transcendent wisdom, aims to investigate this concise and profound statement. The findings of the study indicate that this hadith guides toward monotheism in five interpretive layers. In light of this five-layered interpretation, the research arrives at the conclusion that attaining 'tawhid' is the result of an intensifying and evolutionary process; and in Sadrian wisdom, tawhid, following the examples of the monotheists (al-muwahhidūn), is a graded (tashkīkī) reality, possessing numerous degrees and levels. Ultimately, this writing not only emphasizes the unparalleled capacity of transcendent wisdom in deeply elucidating the knowledge of the Ahl al‑Bayt, but also vividly illustrates the harmony between rational foundations and revelatory teachings. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8733.html This study, adopting a descriptive–analytical approach, examines the nature of death and its various types in the philosophy of Ṣadr al‑Mutaʾallihīn (Mulla Sadra) and seeks to reinterpret his account of death through an analysis of his anthropological and ontological foundations. Mulla Sadra considers the human being a single yet graded reality that advances toward intensification and existential perfection through the process of substantial motion. Accordingly, in his philosophical system death is not merely a biological event, but rather a stage in existential transformation and the soul’s transition from the realm of nature to a higher level of being. An examination of the usages of the term “death” in his works shows that the concept possesses multiple layers and appears in three principal forms: natural, accidental (ikhtirāmī), and voluntary. Natural death occurs when the soul reaches its “appropriate perfection” and a level of existential independence at which continued attachment to the material body is no longer necessary, thereby resulting in the separation of the soul from the body. Mulla Sadra regards this type of death as a divine grace, a means for the human being’s return to God, and a path toward liberation from material constraints. In contrast, accidental death takes place when the body is destroyed by external factors or sudden events, forcing the soul to depart from the body before attaining its ultimate perfection. In addition, voluntary death is presented as a spiritual station in which the seeker, through spiritual struggle and inner purification, detaches from worldly attachments prior to natural death and experiences a form of spiritual death. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8761.html Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, the founder of the **Tafkīk School**, presented a distinct epistemological system as an alternative framework for understanding religious knowledge. The core of this system lies in rejecting the validity of philosophical reason in the fields of metaphysics and theology, while emphasizing alternative sources such as innate human disposition (*fiṭrah*), luminous knowledge (*‘ilm-e nūrī*), luminous intellect (*‘aql-e nūrī*), and definitive religious texts. By fundamentally critiquing universal concepts, rational arguments, and the principle of causality, Isfahani sought to establish a path to preserve pure monotheism (*tawḥīd*) and uphold the absolute transcendence of the Divine Essence from any anthropomorphism or limitation.Within this framework, true knowledge is not attained through mental concepts or philosophical reasoning, but rather through divine effusion and direct, unmediated encounter with truth. The present article elucidates the affirmative foundations of this system while also examining its shortcomings and implications, including: conceptual ambiguity in defining "luminous intellect" and "luminous knowledge"; the lack of measurable criteria and testability; internal contradictions in the position of innate knowledge; and the self-referential challenge in critiquing universal concepts. It further demonstrates that the rejection of the authority of reason and certainty leads to circular reasoning within Isfahani’s epistemological system and undermines the possibility of rational justification for primary religious beliefs.Finally, the social consequences of this approach—such as epistemic isolation and the weakening of interreligious dialogue—are analyzed. This study aims to provide a comprehensive portrayal of the internal coherence and practical viability of this epistemological system. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8793.html The question of whether Strong artificial intelligence could be realized—possessing attributes of the rational soul such as self‑awareness, cognition, semantic understanding, and mental states—has in recent years become a central topic in scientific discussions, particularly within the field of philosophy of artificial intelligence. Drawing upon the foundations of Islamic philosophy, especially the doctrines of Peripatetic philosophy Illuminationist philosophy and Transcendent Philosophy, it can be argued that the realization and attachment of a soul to an artificial entity appears impossible. In both the Peripatetic and Illuminationist traditions, only a body that meets specific conditions can possess the capacity to receive the rational soul. First, it must possess a particular course of temperamentary equilibrium and elemental harmony; second, it must be a natural body endowed with organic instruments and faculties necessary for vital activities. These conditions are realized only in certain natural bodies, such as those found in plants and animals, and not in artificial bodies. Within Transcendent Philosophy, although these conditions are also acknowledged, the principle of the corporeal origination of the soul—according to which the soul emerges from the body itself—has led some researchers to assume that the realization of the rational soul within an artificial structure could be readily accepted. However, a closer analysis indicates that the doctrine of the soul’s corporeal origination is itself restricted by specific conditions and by no means implies that the soul can arise from any type of body or matter. Accordingly, from the perspective of Islamic philosophy, the possibility of realizing Strong artificial intelligence and the emergence of the rational soul within an artificial system must be regarded as untenable. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8801.html This research explores the links between the pillars of Imam Muhammad Ghazali's thought within the three dimensions of theology, cosmology, and anthropology, elucidating how he bridges the negation of causality in nature with the affirmation of a certain necessity within the human soul. In the realm of cosmology, to safeguard divine omnipotence, Ghazali negates the necessary connection between material phenomena, labeling it merely "divine habit" (*'adat Allah*). However, in anthropology, he turns toward an essential causal hierarchy among the soul's faculties, desires, and intentions to establish an ethical and epistemological system.Within this framework, the process of thought (*khawatir*), inclination, and will is depicted as a systematic chain where "knowledge" acts as the primary mover, shaping changes in human identity. This continuity reaches its zenith in theology, as proximity to God is only possible through refining this internal system and polishing the mirror of the heart. The results of this study, conducted through a descriptive-analytical method, demonstrate that Ghazali shifts causality from the physical world to the psychological realm to ensure the path of spiritual perfection remains governed by order. Ultimately, negating external causality to preserve "Divine Unity of Action" does not conflict with affirming internal necessity for achieving divine knowledge; thus, this distinction between realms prevents any contradiction in his thought. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8802.html The incorporeality (or immateriality) of the soul is one of the most fundamental issues in Islamic philosophy, for which multiple proofs have been advanced. One such proof is the argument based on the stability of memory. According to its two formulations, memory images cannot be considered material because of their stability in essence or their representational consistency over several stages of recollection. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach and an analytical method, this paper re-examines both senses of stability in light of findings from neuroscience and cognitive psychology. The empirical findings, at both the neurological and psychological levels, present a dynamic and fluid picture of memory that poses a serious challenge to both senses of the stability of memory images. However, contrary to the conclusions of previous research, the paper shows that due to a fundamental methodological difference between philosophy (which relies on knowledge by presence) and empirical sciences (which rely on external observation), the empirical explanations offered cannot bring about any change in the philosophical conception of the stability of memories. https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8816.html The question of human nature and the debate between corporealism and immaterialism constitutes one of the most expansive discussions in the history of Islamic thought. Employing the methods of “historical discourse analysis” and “conceptual genealogy,” and drawing upon the theoretical framework of “paradigm shift,” this study examines the evolution of theological psychology across three historical periods. The findings reveal that in the first period, under the dominance of a text-centered paradigm and the autonomy of kalām, monist and materialist dualist theories (corporealism) formed the hard core of theologians’ beliefs. In the second period (7th–11th centuries AH), epistemological anomalies arising from external factors—namely, encounter with Greek philosophy—and the interpenetration of theology and philosophy, while shifting the locus of discussion from “moral obligation” to “resurrection,” paved the way for the gradual infiltration of arguments for immateriality. Finally, in the third period, under the hegemony of transcendent theosophy (ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliya), the immateriality of the soul became an “assumed principle” and the dominant paradigm in later kalām. This article concludes that the transition from corporealism to immaterialism was less the product of mere textual investigation than the outcome of a fundamental shift in the “epistemic order,” the influence of historical-civilizational contexts, and the transfer of authority from the literal text to the demonstrative rational system.