From Bayes’ Theorem to Rejection of Atheistic

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Department of Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet's Descendants) Studies, Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet's Descendants) Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

2 PhPhD Student of Contemporary Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran.

Abstract

Based on naturalism in the discussion of evolution, human cognitive faculties have been produced through natural selection, genetic mutation and other blind stages of random mutation of genes, and the ultimate goal of these powers is survival and reproduction (adaptation). Therefore, these faculties do not seek to produce correct beliefs, but their main task is to adapt the living organism to the surrounding environment and thus survive. One of the most significant criticisms of atheistic naturalism is the Bayesian evolutionary argument (BEA). The model of BEA against naturalism is taken from Bayes’ theorem. Despite some strengths of BEA in the criticism of naturalism, since BEA does not pay attention to some requirements of Bayes' theorem, it needs reflection and completion: First, this argument does not pay attention to assigning any particular value. Second, the reliability of cognitive faculties sometimes requires suspension. Third, the reliability of beliefs is classified in different types. Fourth, the Bayesian argument ignores other evidence related to the reliability of cognitive faculties. Fifth, the result “probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties is 1” is a false result according to Bayes' verification theory. Sixth, independent evidence may temporarily rescue naturalism and evolution from self-defeating, but self-defeating naturalism can be proven through other arguments, and therefore self-defeating is still valid. This paper has two goals: I. analysis of BEA in rejection of naturalism. II. provide additions and suggestions to completing it.

Keywords

References

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