The Critique of the Theory of Language Games in Second Wittgenstein

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

faculty member of IRIP

Abstract

 
Wittgenstein had two views about meaning and essence of language. The first view holds that there is a one to one correspondence between meaning and words and language use is considered equal to denomination. The second view links the meaning of words to their usage. Language is a social practice similar to participating in a game which requires that a person live in the language game so that they may understand the language and its rules. Language games have nothing in common and their rules are unique to them. Wittgenstein’s view is flawed: with regard to the nature of context, the role of intention and use in understanding and establishing meaning is ambiguous; the boundaries of language games are not clear and it is not clear where a game starts and ends. Being self-contradictory, his view is neither inclusive nor exclusive and has examples of repeated contradictions. In addition, this view leads to the rejection of meta-criterion in epistemology, which subsequently questions the validity of the theory itself. This view is also problematic in that it rules out the possibility that the players of two games can engage in communication.
 

Keywords


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