Agent-Causation and Rationality Problem

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor Department of Philosophy Faculty of Literature and Humanities Kharazmi University Tehran Iran

Abstract

The most widely discussed skeptical argument to show the incoherency of Libertarian freedom is the one raised by Galen Strawson, which he calls the Basic Argument and has been the subject of much debate. The main idea of this argument is; Having a true free will of the libertarian kind would require that one be a causa sui—a cause of oneself. But being a causa sui is impossible for human beings. This problem is described as "the intelligibility Question" or ‘luck’ problem. The Question is; Can we make sense of freedom that is incompatible with determinism? The ‘intelligibility’ arises when the actions seem to lack sufficient reason. Agent-causalists claim that their view can solve the problem. According to this view, agent has a kind of relation to their actions -direct causation- which is a primitive one; it is not reducible into causation by events or occurrences. In this study, the basic argument and agent-causal position on control are examined. It is concluded that it is possible for agent-causal view to evade the threat of this argument.

Keywords

References

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