Inconsistency between Plantinga’s general and religious episteme

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 associat professor

2 Assistant Prof of Mohaghegh Ardabili University

3 Associate Prof of Payame Noor

Abstract

If we take the assumption that the principles of a theory should be consistent with its whole and study the relationship between Plantinga’s general epistemology and religious epistemology, we realize that most of his controversial arguments in the domain of religious epistemology, known for being grounded in the theory of faith in God, are inconsistent with his own general epistemology which is realized in the theory of warrant. It is not easy to assume that the recent conflicting claims can be derived from the theory of warrant. The most important indications of incompatibility discussed in this article are:  i) Plantinga's theory of general epistemology argues that with the proper functioning of epistemic faculties, one can probably achieve very true beliefs; yet, he considers achieving certain and fundamental beliefs to be the product of appropriate functioning of theological faculties; ii) in general epistemology, the warrant of a belief results in its truthfulness. However, to him, truthfulness in religious beliefs renders the warrant; iii) according to the theory of proper functioning, a faculty loses its proper function and may not lead to a true belief if it is not actualized. However, in the case of a theological faculty, it is possible that even a non-actualized faculty functions properly and leads to a confirming true belief; iv) the construct of religious experiences is different from that of general experiences; v) the element of proper situation does not play a key role in the general beliefs, while, in religious beliefs, it leads to infallible ones.

Keywords

References

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