A Survey on Inability of the Theory of Supervenience to Explain Mental Causation

Homazadeh Abyaneh, Mehdi

doi:10.22099/jrt.2014.2447

A Survey on Inability of the Theory of Supervenience to Explain Mental Causation

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Mehdi Homazadeh Abyaneh

10.22099/jrt.2014.2447

Abstract

Donald Davidson, a great analytic philosopher, represented a theory on token identity through which he provided another theory concerning the relation between mental and physical properties called "Supervenience" theory. He tried to avoid involving in reductionism through preserving dualism of these properties.
In this Paper first, we explain his theory, then we show how he failed to solve mental causation problem and how his theory faces with either causal exclusion or overdetermination. So, the main problem of Cartesian dualism remains unsolved in this theory.

Keywords

References

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