First Order Account Versus the Second Order Account of the Concept "Practice"

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor of Iranian Institute of Philosophy

Abstract

In this paper, firstly, it is shown that the standard account of the concept ‘practice’ in the Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a therapeutic one. According to this account, the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words cannot be put into words. This account can be seen as the negative aspect of the whole idea of normativity. Secondly, I argue that therapy alone is not adequate. In order to give a plausible account of the whole idea of normativity, the positive aspect of the concept ‘practice’ has to be presented. Thirdly, I suggest that distinguishing between the first order and the second order account of the concept ‘practice’ might be a way of explaining the positive aspect. According to the first order account, the constituents of the concept ‘practice’ have to be given. The second order account sketches out the idea that practice goes all the way down. Our confrontation with things in the world is based upon doing rather than theorising at the very basic level. Overt activities ultimately depend on mental activities. 

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References

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Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University
Volume 10, Issue 36 - Serial Number 36
October 2010
Pages 125-135

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