Symbolical Anthropology in Sheikh al-Ishraq's Mystic Narratives
Asadollah
Azhir
Assistant Professor at Theology Department of Razi University
author
Azadeh
Elyasi
Department of Islamic Theology, Faculty of Humanities, Razi University, Kermanshah, Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
Knowing human nature is one of the most important elements in Suhravardi's philosophy and therefore, his works, especially his symbolical and metaphorical narratives, are grounds for understanding human essence. According to his view, human soul is an illuminous substance, equal to transcendental spirits and even to God. The goal of the philosophy must be to save the soul and to help man release himself from the darkness of the body and the prison of this world. Symbols used in Sheikh al-Ishraq's mystic-philosophical narratives can be categorized in cosmological, theological and anthropological categories. The anthropological symbols are the main both in frequency and in goal. Although some symbols are formally peripatetic, but the meanings he derives are illuminous (Ishraqi). The implications of some other symbols don’t fit seemingly to the principles of his masterpiece Hikmat al-Ishraq. It can be due to his creative and inspired imagination which precedes his systemizing reason.
Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University
Shiraz University
2251-6123
19
v.
71
no.
2019
1
22
https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_5278_d2b59b67dab69b65b6e6af583e37cfd3.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22099/jrt.2019.31715.1987
Constraints of the Cognitive Sciences of Religion in Explaining the Natural Process of the Formation and Strengthening of Religious Beliefs
sayyed mahdi
biabanaki
Assistant Professor, Isfahan Univesity, Isfahan, Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
The cognitive science of religion is a "scientific" approach to study the religion, which seeks to provide the causal explanations for religious beliefs and behaviors. The defenders of the cognitive sciences of religion try to explain the process of formation, strengthening, and prevalence of religious beliefs with the help of natural features of human mind and explaining its mode of operation. In their view, human mental tools are formed so that they have special support for the concept of "God" (and other basic concepts of religion). These mental tools have significant processing biases in accepting the religious beliefs, ultimately leading to the formation, strengthening, and spread of religious beliefs. Thus, this study was conducted to explain the natural process of the formation and strengthening of religious beliefs from the perspective of the cognitive sciences of religion, to extract the explanatory limitations of this approach. The findings of the present study showed that, the cognitive science of religion faces two basic explanatory constraints. The first type results from the lack of attention to the supernatural and social dimensions of religious phenomena, and the second type is due to the explanatory limitations of cognitive mechanisms.
Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University
Shiraz University
2251-6123
19
v.
71
no.
2019
23
42
https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_5279_72acec6ae82222d5e4bb0ccac3ca201b.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22099/jrt.2019.31178.1957
Can Moral Responsibility Be Grounded Free-Will-Debate Freely? Examining the Reactive Attitudes Approach
Roohoolah
Haghshenas
Department of Philosophy, Farabi College, University of Tehran
author
text
article
2019
per
Moral responsibility is one of the most philosophical subjects with practical significance. Based on this practical significance, P. F. Strawson argued that we can, and we should, ground our theory of moral responsibility on the reactive attitudes like blame and praise free-will-debate freely. In this paper, we study Strawsonian approaches that are known as reactive attitudes approach. For this, we propose “history challenges” for this approach. Then we argue that this approach can be successful against these challenges only by grounding a limited notion of moral responsibility on a limited list of reactive attitudes as Scanlon did. We argue that although Scanlon’s theory is not intuitive, it has the virtue of self-consistence. We also show that there are two levels of responsibility that Scanlon’s “two forms of responsibility” better describes it than the popular Attributability-Accountability distinction. We also show the significance of this limited, but successful, case of reactive attitudes approach.
Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University
Shiraz University
2251-6123
19
v.
71
no.
2019
43
70
https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_5282_a753ab9bb101d052cf1c6d8343fb56e0.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22099/jrt.2019.32175.2024
Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism
And Sosa's critique and Plantinga's response
motahareh
shohouei pour ali nam
Student
author
mohammad
keivanfar
philosophy, Islamic philosophy, university of religions and denominations, Qom
author
text
article
2019
per
Alvin Plantinga, on the relationship between science and religion, has two general approaches: defensive and aggressive. In the first approach, he tries to show that there is no deep-seated conflict between science and religion. But in the second approach, it seeks to show that, contrary to popular opinion, there is a profound conflict between science and naturalism. He puts forward an argument called "evolutionary argument against naturalism." The main idea of his argument is that the probability of the reliability of the cognitive capacity of man with the acceptance of the combination of naturalism and the theory of evolution is low, and this includes all beliefs produced by the cognitive capacity of man, including the very belief in naturalism. Therefore, the simultaneous acceptance of naturalism and the theory of evolution is not reasonable , While this problem does not exist in the simultaneous acceptance of theism and evolutionary theory. Plantinga's argument has come up with many reactions and criticisms. Ernest Sosa has written two criticisms. By referring to Descartes and distinguishing between non-reflective and reflectivel knowledge; By referring to Descartes and distinguishing between non-formal and informal knowledge, he considers Plantinga to be essentially concerned with reflective knowledge and considers it to be incorrect; in Sosa's view, the status of theism and naturalism is the same. Plantinga, on the other hand, sees the main problem in reflctive knowledge, and believes that theism is better than naturalism, because naturalism is confronted with a defeater.
Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University
Shiraz University
2251-6123
19
v.
71
no.
2019
71
92
https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_5281_070e4abc8cca8db10fe224aac15b8a9f.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22099/jrt.2019.31422.1971
Philosophical intelligibles from the poin of view of Sadruddin Muhammad Dashtaki
MohammadBagher
Abbasi
assistant Prof of Shiraz University
author
Ali
Rahimi
phd student at shiraz university
author
text
article
2019
per
Before Mulla Sadra, the intelligibles were divided into the primary and the secondary. However, in the words of Farabi and Ibn Sina, there was a distinction between logical secondary intelligible and philosophical secondary intelligible but philosophical secondary intelligible phrase was not forged. Mulla Sadra, in addition to forging this term, developed this discussion and evolved it. Sadra aI-Din Muhammad Dashtaki, one of the elders of the philosophical school of Shiraz, has taken a unique view of this discussion. This essay explains the views of Sadruddin Muhammad Dashtaki on secondary intelligible in detail for the first time, relying on the manuscript of his old commentary of Qushchi's commentary. The semantic of secondary intelligible, the devision of derivative and non-derivative intelligibles and the external union of the intelligibles with its (their) own subjects and external qualification or qualification in mind are included in this review. In addition, Mulla Sadra's report has been documented in terms of Dashtaki's statements. The main characteristic of his thinking in this discussion is that he divides philosophical concepts into derivative and non- derivative, and believes external derivatives intelligibles, as existent and contingent, are united with their own subjects, while non- derivative intelligible such as the existence and possibility has considered it a mental construct.
Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University
Shiraz University
2251-6123
19
v.
71
no.
2019
93
114
https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_5280_763354e8b123d35c4fcb82305349d41b.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22099/jrt.2019.31395.1969
Investigating the Influence of Mulla Sadra's Principles and Thoughts on Text Meaning
s. Mohammad Hosain
Mirdamadi
Associate Professor, Isfahan University, Islamic Philosophy Department
author
Mohammad
Bidhindi
Associate Professor, Isfahan University, , Faculty of Literature Islamic Philosophy Department))
author
Majed
Sadighi
Associate Professor, Isfahan University, , Faculty of Literature Islamic Philosophy Department))
author
text
article
2019
per
The meaning of the text and the anagogical interpretation of meaning in Sadra's school is affected by his views and principles. Hence, in his philosophy, the explanatory meanings are justifiable and logical. In Sadra's school, meaning, which is the outcome of the man's exposure to the universe, has an actual fact that a heavenly figure can explain it and determine it, and uses its capabilities to introduce the facts of different realms. Sadra's principles and views, including the fundamental reality of existence, the gradation of being, the rule of non-composite real, as well as Sadra's view on psychology, substantial motion and fixed Essences somehow impacts the logic of the meaning of the world of sense or the world of imagination and reason, and they can explain the ontological foundations of the anagogical interpretation of the text. This paper studies the impacts of the Sadra's principles and views on the meaning of the text, and it highlights some texts that have been analyzed by Sadra in this respect. Using a descriptive-analytical method, and while referring to Sadra's view regarding the anagogical interpretations, this paper shows the capability of Sadra's Philosophy in developing the meaning of text, and studies his logic in the anagogical interpretation from the aforementioned viewpoint. This paper seeks to illustrate the logic of Sadra's anagogical interpretations on the extracted meanings of the text.
Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University
Shiraz University
2251-6123
19
v.
71
no.
2019
115
134
https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_5288_8fff6a82a65c3f2e29c3291c7620a805.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22099/jrt.2019.32527.2040
Consciousness and self- consciousness in Mulla Sadra and Kant
Isa
Najmabadi
Philosophy, Human sciences, Esfahan, Esfahan, Iran.
author
Mahdi
Dehbashi
Khorasgan university
author
text
article
2019
per
Knowledge in Sadra’ philosophy, is merely presence of something near Percipient. The most perfect sense of “presence” under this school, is intuitive knowledge of human being about “self” within which knowing and known have unity. Hence, From Sadra’s view, “knowledge” of “self” has a very high rank position in philosophy. However, what is described as " intuitive knowledge to self" in transcendental wisdom, From Kant’s view is not intuitive knowledge ; but this knowledge is also a kind of our empirical knowledge where is obtained through mediation of “subjective form” which is called “appearance” by Kant. But Kant believes that other than this “empirical ego” assigned to “transcendental ego” He believes that it cannot, as Nomenon, be placed in the center of the human experiential vision. Therefor, he neither believes knowledge of self as an acquired knowledge nor as intuitive one. In this article, we explains this problem of why Mulla Sadra considers intuitive cognition of self. This problem is embedded within a more general problem : Whether that ego which comprehends itself belongs to knowledge ? In this paper, we will show that the “knowledge” of “self”, unlike Kant's conception, cannot be explained except by the existential attitude, because intuitive perception is a kind of presence in existence and for existence.
Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University
Shiraz University
2251-6123
19
v.
71
no.
2019
135
150
https://jrt.shirazu.ac.ir/article_5283_42034925c71f0b9e730f6916a19d54d1.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22099/jrt.2019.32823.2065