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*Fundamental Explication of Transcendence in Mulla
Sadra's and Heidegger's Philosophy¹*

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Abstract

The concept of transcendence plays a vital role in Heidegger's philosophy, Such that his philosophy can not be understood without knowing the meaning of this notion. For Heidegger transcendence is a way for overcoming Cartesian subjectivism. According to Heidegger Dasein is not a separated entity from the world, it is not a mere intellectual substance (res cogitans), but rather it is being-in-the-world. It means before establishing an epistemological relationship with other beings in the world, Dasein has a pre-epistemological attunement with beings and pure Being as the foundation of all finite beings. Dasein always lives in a pre-understanding of Being and this pre-understanding is the foundation of all human knowledge. Dasien is not closed to and separated from other beings; it is always open to beings and Being itslef. This openness is the foundation of Dasein's transcendence. So for Heidegger, Dasein's transcendence is just pre-epistemological and is the foundation of its knowledge. But, while Heidegger tries to search the roots of this transcendence in Dasien's being alone, Mulla Sadra's philosophy leads to a deeper root of this transcendental structure. For Mulla Sadra man's transcendence is the result of his existential and necessary relationship to pure Being. This concept can be understood only under the light of Sadra's innovative interpretation of the relationship between cause and effect. In Mulla Sadra's philosophy transcendence has three different dimensions all of which are derived from a common root dependency of man as a finite being on God as pure and absolute Being. These dimensions are existential, pre-epistemological and post-epistemological.

Key Words: 1. Transcendence 2. Heidegger 3. Mulla Sadra
4. Temporality 5. Existential Dependency 6. Pre-epistemological
7. Post-epistemological.

1. Introduction

The concept of transcendence has been always the axis of

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long philosophical debates. Especially in modern western thought where the notion plays a leading role. From Kant till now the western philosophy has been involved with this concept in different manners, in the philosophy of great philosophers like Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Husserl, Heidegger and so on.

Amongst all of these thinkers, this is only Heidegger who has tried to unveil the roots of transcendence and to show us the deepest layers of the epistemological and ontological aspects of the notion. But with all due respects to his attempts, we believe that we can look at the matter from other perspectives that may lead us to a deeper layer of the essence of transcendence. In our opinion this can be done by using the bases of Mulla Sadra's transcendental philosophy and this is our aim in this paper to open a new horizon for getting approached to the deepest roots of this complicated concept.

This paper is divided in three parts, in the first part we try to give a concise account on the concept according to Heidegger's viewpoint. In the second part we try to introduce and elaborate on the notion in Mulla Sadra's philosophy and try to see the different aspects of the matter in his philosophy in contrast to Heidegger's philosophy. Finally, we represent the conclusion of this paper and the horizon that it might open for the future comparative studies.

2. The Concept of Transcendence in Heidegger's Philosophy

Heidegger is one of the greatest contemporary philosophers, his works encompasses all the major matters in western philosophy and rarely do we can find a major problem in the western philosophy that his curious thought has not been involved with, Inasmuch as, he has entered even in marginal matters like art, politics, and technology in his contemplations and tried to represent a new interpretation on the matter using his viewpoint. Consequently, if we want to get the depth of his philosophy, we should find a pivotal point to understand and interpret all of his thought around this point; and what would be the most appropriate concept in his philosophy to play this role than the idea of transcendence? Transcendence is the main key for understanding Heidegger's philosophy. Without understanding this concept none of his philosophical viewpoints can be understood. His question of

Being², his turn from beings to Being, his criticism of subjectivism, his interpretation of man as Dasein³ and its relation to the world, none of them could be comprehended without the idea of transcendence.

The most important goal of this paper is to give the short and clear account of the notion, according to the major works of Heidegger. Then we are going to show that he could not get to the deepest reality beneath the concept, albeit he attempted too much. In the end, we try to find a new way to the depth of the concept and its roots using the Mulla Sadra's transcendental philosophy.

Transcend, *transzendieren*, *transzendenz* and *transzendent*, come from the Latin *transcendere*, 'to climb (scendere) over, across (trans)'. Heidegger also uses its Germanic counterparts, *übersteigen*, 'to climb over, surmount, exceed, transcend', and *überschreiten*, 'to cross, exceed'(14, P:225).

The first meaning, as part of the concept pair transcendence/immanence, is used primarily with reference to God's relation to the world and is particularly important in theology. Here *transcendent* means that God is completely outside of and beyond the world, as contrasted with the notion that God is manifested in the world. This meaning originates both in the Aristotelian view of God as the prime mover, a non-material self-consciousness that is outside of the world. Philosophies of immanence such as stoicism, Spinoza or *pantheism* maintain that God is manifested in and fully present in the world and the things in the world. The Latin *transcendens* and *transcentalis* were applied by medieval philosophers to being, truth, unity and goodness, for the reason that these terms apply to entities in all the categories, the highest genera, and do not they demarcate a genus.

Kant distinguished between the 'transcendent', a concept or entity that surpasses our experience (e.g. God), and the 'transcendental', what pertains to the possibility of our experiential knowledge.

"I call all knowledge *transcendental* if it is occupied, not with objects, but with the way that we can possibly know objects even before we experience them" (15, P:59; A12, B26)⁴. But Kant does not explain what the foundation of 'transcendence' is? Or how transcendental knowledge is possible? While Heidegger tries to show that transcendence is nothing but Dasein himself. It is the

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most fundamental and structural characteristic of a kind of being, called Dasein.

Heidegger distinguishes four different meanings of 'transcendence' (14, P: 226):

1. Ontical Transcendence: in this meaning, transcendence is the characteristic of a being that transcended beings; in Christianity, God, the creator has transcended created beings. God is not manifested or immanent in the world rather, he is fully outside and beyond the world.
2. The Ontological Transcendence: this kind of transcendence lies in the *koinon* ('common' in Greek) as such, beingness as the general (genera - categories - 'above' and 'before' beings, *a priori*). This is the approach of Aristotle and his medieval followers, who examined being (ness) as a *transcendens*, but left unclear the difference between being and beings.
3. 'Fundamental-Ontological'⁵ Transcendence (9, P:364-8): this reverts to the original sense of 'transcendence', surmounting (*Übersteigung*), and is conceived as a distinctive feature of Dasein (or rather, Da-Sein'), indicating that it 'always already stands in the Open of beings'. Dasein's transcendence involves pre-understanding of being. And this pre-understanding shows his open-ness to world and to Being as the foundation of other beings. On the other hand, this open-ness guarantees Dasein's *a priori* synthetic knowledge (10, P:18). This meaning of transcendence , as the base of his criticism against subjectivism, is the core of Heidegger's philosophy.
4. Epistemological or Cartesian transcendence: a subject surmounts the barrier or gulf between itself and its object, between its inner space and the external world. No such transcendence occurs, Heidegger insists. In virtue of transcendence in sense three, Dasein is open to intra-worldly objects, separated from them by no gulf or barrier.

Making contrast between these last two meanings of transcendence, one can understand the role of the concept in Heidegger's philosophy and in the current of western philosophy. In other word, Heidegger by putting more emphasis on the third meaning of transcendence in his philosophy and contrasting it with the fourth or lets say

Cartesian meaning represents a new definition of man and his relationship with world.

If one wants to fathom out what Heidegger means by transcendence, one should firstly consider his critique of subjectivism and of Descartes as the main feature of the current. But what is the meaning of subjectivism? What is Descartes contribution to the notion? And what are the most important deficiencies in it, mentioned by Heidegger? How can one overcome these inherent problems of subjectivism? These are the questions which can directly guide us to the core of the matter. Actually, we are trying to answer these questions in this paper.

According to Heidegger the history of western metaphysics that is the history of forgetfulness of Being is the ground out of which subjectivism has emerged (9, P: 43)⁶. Because one can easily trace the roots of subjectivism back to the early periods of western metaphysics even in Plato's and Aristotle's works. Subjectivism, as Heidegger believes is the historical destiny (Geschik) of western philosophy.

What is this so mentioned subjectivism? It seems impossible to summarize the meaning of this notion just in one sentence. But if one wants to know the subjectivism better, it is helpful to go step by step by Heidegger to find the foundational elements of the notion. Summarizing different aspects of the matter, one can count the four following as the most constitutive elements of subjectivism.

1. Reducing man into the mere thinking thing, according to this reduction, human being is nothing but a thinking thing, it is a mere subject
2. Putting the epistemological relationship of human being with the world as the base for all other kinds of his relationship with the world.
3. Defining truth as correspondence, and putting the man as the main criteria of truth
4. Separating human being as thinking substance from the world as extended substance.

If we deeply and carefully look at the mentioned elements, we can see that all of these elements despite of being rooted in the history of western metaphysics, have been bolded in the modern philosophy, especially form Descartes on. The responsibility that

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Heidegger undertakes in his philosophy is to find the roots of subjectivism which has been the source of the most important problems, especially in the modern western thought and to make infrastructural reforms in it. To accomplish this vital task, Heidegger tries to go even deeper and finds the hidden deficiency in the western metaphysics that all the four elements mentioned above are not but the symptoms of that. Then he tries to wipe out all of these symptoms by effacing this hidden deficiency. In fact Heidegger's philosophy is a movement against the current of western philosophy to overcome subjectivism as the result of this current (1, P:75).

The modern subjectivism after Descartes has been known by two main characteristics (I) it is ego centric (II) it is epistemological (16, P:3), and it was Descartes who can be truly called the father of modern subjectivism. Descartes' philosophical meditations led to an inevitable separation between man as thinking thing (*res cogitans*) and world as extended thing (*res extensa*).

He started his meditations with a methodic doubt and continued his method till he arrived to the point that was not dubitable. He saw that when he thinks or doubts there should be an agent who thinks or doubts. This agent which we refer to him as "I" became the center of Cartesian philosophy and also the center of subjectivism and "cogito ergo sum" (I think then I exist) became the foundation stone for his philosophy.

"I am, I exist; [this] is certain. But for how long? For as long as I think; for indeed it might be the case that if I cease from all thoughts, at the same time I would entirely cease to exist. I am now admitting nothing except what necessarily is true; I am therefore strictly only a thinking thing" (3, Vol 1, P:151-2).

Therefore, according to Descartes "I" or ego is the first substance which its most essential property is thinking. "I" is essentially separated from the material world and body as part of it as the essentially extended substance.

Human soul or ego is essentially a thinking thing and does not have any thing in common with material world which is essentially extended. This conclusion that Descartes' mediations led to, has made a great impact on the western philosophy then

after. Descartes philosophy was the source of new approaches toward the man and its relationship with world and became the foundation stone for subjectivism. As we mentioned above subjectivism is made upon some elementary concepts that all of them have crystallized in Descartes philosophy.

According to Heidegger the most important problem of Descartes philosophy is the separation of thinking from being which leads to the separation of man from his world. In Heidegger's term Descartes' subject is a worldless subject which is essentially detached from his world (9, P: 254). But these are all due to the ignorance of the being of subject and taking it simply as a thinking thing (*res cogitans*) (*Ibid*, P: 254). Descartes by giving priority to the essence of subject over its being by bringing *cogito* before *sum* made the subject separated from being or "*res cogitans*" separated from "*sum*". Consequently, '*sum*' will be the result drawn from *cogito* and essentially is divorced from subject. This separation of subject from its world which is the result of the uprooting subject from its being still has its root in a greater and more serious forgetfulness and separation.

As Heidegger believes, this perpetual forgetfulness or ignorance, i.e. the forgetfulness of Being as the basis and foundation for all beings, is the historical destiny of western metaphysics, (7, P: 392-406) yet it is the deepest root of subjectivism and all the problems arising from it. Consequently subjectivism is the result of two different historical mistakes. Firstly, ignorance of Being as the basis for all other beings. Secondly, separating the being of subject from its essence and giving priority to its essence over its being which led to the priority of epistemology over ontology in western metaphysics hitherto.

To recover these historical mistakes, Heidegger, at the first step tries to bring back the Being to the attention of western philosophy. He accomplishes this by reviving the question of the meaning of Being and trying to approach to a new understanding of being .At the very outset of his book "Being and Time" he utters:

"Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being" (9, P:1).

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At the second step, he tries to achieve and represent a new understanding of man and its relationship with world under the light of the new understanding of Being. He draws a new image from the man and his world which is completely opposite to the traditional image. And for taking these two steps the concept of transcendence as the most constitutional concept in Heidegger's philosophy plays a vital role.

Is it possible to define Being? How can one get the meaning of Being? And why this question has today been forgotten? These are the most important questions, which all Heidegger's exertions in his investigation is to find an answer them. Starting from last question, He recites three different reasons or in a more exact phrase, three different presuppositions for taking the question of the meaning of Being as something unnecessary and superfluous. "Firstly, it has been maintained that Being is the most universal concept. Secondly, it has been maintained that the concept of Being is indefinable. Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self evident."(9, P:22-23). To overcome all of these presuppositions he tries to formulate the question of Being and to sketch out the pass one must take for getting to the answer of this question.

It was Heidegger's conviction, that if we want to understand the meaning of Being, we must start from the understanding itself. We already live in an understanding of Being. This pre-understanding of Being is not clear and well-defined to us, this is a "vague average understanding of Being "(Ibid, P:25). In his deepest contemplation on the nature of understanding, Heidegger implies that there is an essential unity between understanding and Being. The process of understanding in the deepest meaning is the process of the manifestation and demonstration of Being. At the same time understanding is the most constitutional aspect of the man as the agent of this understanding. As the result the best way for getting to the meaning of Being is to start from the understander and to know his structural determinations. This, for Heidegger is a shortcut to the land of Being. This is mentionable that the kind of understanding which is the most constitutional element of human being is completely different from that of held and accepted in the western tradition as a conceptual knowledge. This understanding is the openness of man to the demonstrations of Being.

For Heidegger man is a gate to the land of Being, but why the man can be open to the demonstrations of Being? And why the only man can play this role? What dose differentiates man from other entities and enables him to be open to all the demonstrations and manifestations of Being. For Heidegger the main reason is transcendental structure of man. Man is the only entity who lives in a pre-understanding of Being. He has a kind of pre-attunement to Being and his openness to Being is derived from this constitutional property i.e. from his transcendental structure.

According to Heidegger man unlike other entities is not closed to and separated from his world. Having world is the structural and essential aspect of human being, it is his existential. and it is impossible to conceive man without his world. To put emphasis on this constitutive element Heidegger coins a new term for calling man in his philosophy. Dasein which literally means being-there is best showing the fundamental structure of man. Dasein is always there in the world, it is out there, it is not closed to and separated from world. It is Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger Being-in-the-world stands for a unitary phenomenon which must be seen as a whole (9, P:78). This term again coined by Heidegger and designated to refer to the most fundamental structure of Dasein, reflects the Heidegger departure form the Cartesian interpretation of man and his relationship with world. In his interpretation on the term he emphasize that one can not think of "Being-in" as the being something spatially in something else or something contained in something else, As for example water is in the glass or garment is in the cupboard. Rather this Being-in reflects the very tight and firm relationship between man and his world. Being-in here means 'to be familiar with' or 'to be accustomed to' and it means that Dasein lives and dwell in the world before he put the world as a matter of theoretical investigation and it is essential and existential property of Dasein.

"“Being-in” is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state" (9, P:80).

This Being-in-the-world for Heidegger is the core of the transcendental structure of Dasein. Dasein transcends and goes beyond the sphere of his consciousness and has a pre-theoretical relationship with world. The relationship which is always neglected

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and remains hidden beneath all the metaphysical and philosophical theories. To highlight this pre-theoretical relationship with the world, Heidegger introduces two different approaches to the world and entities i.e. ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. According to Heidegger when we use an equipment such as hammer we do not concern it as a matter of theoretical investigation, we might not even have any theoretical knowledge about it but we are using it in-order-to something and “in dealing such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the in-order-to...” (9, P:98) and in this approach we take entities as ready-to-hand.

“The kind of Being which equipment possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call ‘readiness-to-hand’ [*Zuhandenheit*]”(Ibid, P: 98).

This approach is pre-theoretical and shows the way in which Dasein deals with equipments in its daily life, meanwhile there is another approach to an equipment such as hammer which reflects another approach of Dasein to the world and its entities. In this approach that is totally epistemological and theoretical the things are considered as a matter of theoretical knowledge. In Heidegger term, in this approach the things are taken as present-at-hand [*Vorhanden*].

This is exactly why, Heidegger refers to the being of Dasein with existence that means being out there. Dasein is the only entity which has ecstasy, and this ecstasy is the structural determination of this being. Consequently it is the only entity that properly can be called existence. Actually, all of these terms are different ways of calling Dasein’s disclosedness to the world.

Now we can say all of these strange words such as Dasein, Being-in-the-world, ecstasy, transcendence, existence are employed to refer to the most essential and structural determination of man. Indeed, it is exactly in this way that Dasein is differentiated from other entities. While other entities are closed to the world and imprisoned in the sphere of their own being, Dasein is the only entity which is always open to the world, the only entity which has world, the only entity which is Being-in-the-world and the only entity which always transcends the boundaries of its being. It exists and resides out of all constraints and limitations put to him by the western metaphysical tradition. It is not a thinking substance separated from world as extended substance. Rather it is an entity

that having world is part of his constitutional element, It is Being-in-the-world, and this is the special property of Dasein.

As we have seen, the idea of transcendence is a key concept in Heidegger's philosophy, transcendence is the way adopted by Heidegger to overcome the problems of subjectivism. But in his contemplations, Heidegger even goes deeper and asks another fundamental question. What is the essence of transcendence? What makes human being to be a transcendental entity? In his famous Interpretations on Kant⁷, Heidegger after a long and very deep discussion on the subject comes to this consequence that the root of Dasein's transcendence is his faculty of transcendental imagination. According to Heidegger this transcendental imagination is the common root of both sensibility and understanding as the two main sources of human knowledge. According to Kant through the former i.e. sensibility, objects are given to us and through the latter they are thought (15, P:92, A51, B75). Here there is a very important question that Kant asked it for the first time and Heidegger revived it again. What makes the given-ness of objects possible? How can things turn to be the object of our knowledge? According to Kant there are three different synthesis which make the given-ness of objects possible. These three synthesis are the transcendental activities of subject as the agent of knowledge. These three synthesis are synthesis of apprehension, synthesis of reproduction and synthesis of recognition, and Kant assigns just the second synthesis to imagination but for Heidegger all of these three synthesis are related to this faculty and all of them have their common root in the transcendental imagination(10, P:281).

"Here we see that the synthesis on the basis of which the unity of transcendental apperception is a synthetic unity is represented by the productive synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination. Put differently, the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception is the transcendental unity of the pure productive synthesis of the power of imagination. This original synthesis of the pure power of imagination is the ground of the possibility all knowledge..... (10, P: 278).

This is Heidegger's conviction that the transcendental imagination is the root of our cognitive faculties. Imagination is both receptive and spontaneous, and thus gives rise to both pure intuition and pure thought.

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While in ‘Being and Time’ he introduces temporality as the essence of Dasein’s transcendence, in his interpretation on Kant he tries to introduce the faculty of transcendental imagination as the root of Dasein’s temporality. Temporality is the horizon of so-called Dasein and it is the horizon of all of its existentialia . Dasein is essentially a temporal being. This temporality for Heidegger does not simply mean that Dasein lives in time or he is a temporal being like many other beings but it means that this temporality just belongs to Dasein and no other entity shares with him in this meaning. Heidegger identifies the three dimension of time i.e. present, past and future with three different aspects of Dasein’s ecstasy. He recites three main characteristics of Dasein namely existentiality, facticity and forfeit. These three characteristics are combined in care as the most constitutive element of Dasein.(9, P:235-240) For Heidegger care does not simply mean being anxious or depressed. It must be taken rather as an encompassing the threefold structure: being-ahead-of-itself (existentiality), in already-being-in (facticity) as being-beside (being forfeited).This is temporality which makes the unity of these triad possible. Temporality for Heidegger is the ground of care and must be considered as the basis of totality of all the structural existentialia of Dasein.

At the very outset of his inquiry on temporality of Dasein he poses a very fundamental question.

“What makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care, in the unity of its articulation as we have unfolded it?” (9, P: 371).

For him this is temporality, which plays such a vital role (Ibid, P:370-380). And this temporality is the most constitutive element of Dasein. It is so much interwoven with Dasein’s structural attributes that is inseparable from it. However in his interpretation on Kant, Heidegger emphasizes that this temporality is rooted in transcendental imagination as the common source of all the different kind of human knowledge. Consequently, this is the transcendental imagination which is the root of all the transcendental and existential aspects of Dasein.

"The productive power of imagination is the root of the faculties of subjectivity; it is the basic ecstatic constitution of the subject, of Dasein itself. Insofar as the power of imagination

releases pure time from out of itself, as we have shown (and this means that the power of imagination contains pure time as a possibility), it is original temporality and therefore the radical faculty of ontological knowledge" (10, P: 283).

He believes that Kant himself could not understand and explain this vital point in his philosophy, because he was still thinking under the predominance of Cartesian subjectivism and He could not redeem himself from this closed circle.

According to what mentioned above, transcendence for Heidegger is a foundation of human knowledge, it deals with preconditions of the possibility of human knowledge. Consequently, the Heideggerian transcendence is just pre-epistemological or fundamental-ontological transcendence and one can not draw any other meaning of the notion in his philosophy. (5, P:253–265). On the contrary, in Mulla Sadra's philosophy transcendence has three different meanings all of them raised from a common root, that following part we will try to reveal these different meanings and the common root beneath them.

3. Transcendence in Mulla Sadra's viewpoint

In the second part of this paper we try to delineate another approach to the problem of transcendence. This approach which is derived from Mulla Sadra's philosophy is rebuild in a new language. Our aim is to show and actualize the potential ability in the Islamic philosophy for having a fruitful discourse with the modern and even contemporary western thought. In this dialogue, without a shadow of doubt, Mulla Sadra's philosophy plays a leading role. Because he tries in his philosophy to go beyond the traditional conceptual philosophy and introduces another way of thinking which is based on both conceptualization and immediate intuition. Actually, this is the latter, that makes his philosophical system unique and worthy to study.

For Mulla Sadra transcendence is the main characteristic of his philosophy. He calls his philosophy transcendent philosophy (*al-hikmat al-muta'liyah*)⁸ (18, v1, p:13). Philosophy for him is not just a theoretical speculation but it is the way in which human being can unfold and crystallize his potentialities. Philosophy is an open horizon to the understanding of pure Being both by theoretical contemplations and by reflecting different grades of Being in the

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being of philosopher (Ibid, P:20). That is why for him there is no important difference between philosophy, mysticism and religion because all of them converge in one central point that is the ultimate reality, the reality of all realities, the pure Being. For him this ultimate *telos* is nothing but God or indefinite Being. Real philosophy starts with contemplation on the finite beings and leads to an understanding of pure and indefinite Being as the deepest foundation of all beings. So the path of philosophy is the path of the completion of man. Thus transcendence is not only the characteristic of his philosophy but also is the basic characteristic of man. In his philosophy there is a big difference between man and other entities, and this difference lies in its transcendental structure. In Mulla Sadra's philosophy man is both transcendent and transcendental in its Kantian meaning. It is transcendent because man's essence does not belong to the experimental world and can not be grasped through mere experience. Meanwhile, it is transcendental, for the unique role of such a being and its relationship with other beings in our a priori synthetic knowledge.

In this article we put more emphasis on the transcendental structure of man, but we will show that these two, I mean being transcendental and being transcendent as two different characteristics of human being rise from a common root.

For Mulla Sadra, as it is true about Heidegger, transcendence is the deepest reality of the entity, called human being. The salient characteristic of man for him is its transcendental structure. This transcendence is not only epistemological but at the same time it is existential. But, while Heidegger tries to search the roots of this transcendence in Dasien itself and its pre-epistemological relationship with the world and consequently paraphrases this transcendence with his coined term being-in-the-world. Sadrean philosophy leads us to a deeper root of this transcendental structure. He tries to find the root of this transcendence not just in this being called human being, but he shows that this transcendental structure has another side, a hidden and neglected side which is the root of transcendental structure of human being.

For Mulla Sadra transcendence is not something related just to the being of man, but rather it should be understood in his relationship to pure and absolute Being. Man as an incomplete and limited being is wholly dependent on and related to the absolute

Being, the pure Being, the Being itself. In his innovative interpretation on the relation between cause and effect he attests that the real cause brings the effect to being, in a way that the whole being of effect is a kind of relational entity (18, v1, P:218) the effect is not something independent from its cause and is wholly nothing but an existential dependency on real cause (*Ibid*, P:218). This innovative interpretation can not be fully understood without getting to the depth of his philosophy and knowing the bases of his philosophy. The cornerstone of Mulla Sadra's philosophy is the primacy or principality of existence over quiddity. This means that this is existence which is the source and origin of all effects. Quiddity essentially is nothing but quiddity. In Mulla Sadra's philosophy quiddity is just the limitation or manifestation of being and without being the quiddity is nothing and can not exist. For Mulla Sadra it does not mean that the quiddity is something unreal or just made by human mind but rather, it means that in comparison to the primary reality of existence, quiddity is a secondary reality (*Ibid*, 39-75).

According to Mulla Sadra, since quiddity is nothing but the manifestation and limitation of being, so in relation of cause and effect, the cause can not create the quiddity of effect, because it is a secondary reality, instead it creates the existence of effect and the quiddity will be the manifestation of that being; and because the very being of an effect belongs to cause, thus effect is just an existential dependency, a kind of relational entity (19, p:49). This innovative interpretation of effect and its existential dependency on cause opens a new horizon onto philosophy to give a new interpretation of human being and its relationship to the world.

According to Mulla Sadra since the absolute and pure Being is the final cause of every entity or the cause of all causes, all beings are wholly dependent on and related to the pure and absolute Being, the Being itself, and this will be used as our key concept in this paper (19, P:50).

Here we face with a very important question, is there any relationship between what Heidegger means by the word 'transcendence' and what we can find in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, on the notion? In other word, is there any similarity between the meaning and implications of the concept in the philosophy of these two philosophers. This question makes more sense when we see

that in Mulla Sadra's philosophy 'transcendence' has an ontical or by some kinds of reconstruction ontological meaning, while in Heidegger's philosophy it has pre-ontological meaning. Elaborating more on the matter, we can say for Heidegger, as we mentioned above, transcendence is a kind of pre-ontological relationship or open-ness of Dasein to the beings or pure Being which is the foundation of our epistemological relationship with the world, whereas, in Mulla Sadra's philosophy transcendence is more ontical than being ontological or pre-ontological. It emphasizes on the existential dependency of all beings to pure and absolute Being. But this is just due to the shallow understanding of Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Our claim is that, his philosophy can reveal both pre-epistemological, post-epistemological and existential aspects of human transcendence.

Although, Mulla Sadra's philosophy puts more emphasis on existential transcendence of man, and interprets it as a kind of existential dependency of finite being of man to indefinite and pure Being, because for Mulla Sadra ontology and epistemology are not separated, this existential or ontological interpretation leads to an epistemological consequence. According to Mulla Sadra, since all the finite beings are fully dependent on an infinite and pure Being, our knowledge of these finite beings is again dependent on our pre-understanding of pure Being. In other words, as it is true that all beings are manifestations and determinations of pure Being, it is also true that, all of human knowledge, what so ever, about beings is manifestation of pure knowledge of pure Being. This pure knowledge, according to Mulla Sadra, is not a kind of conceptual knowledge (18, v1, P: 116). It is a kind of existential understanding which he calls simple knowledge(Ibid, P: 1).

As Mulla Sadra believes this kind of knowledge is a kind of innate knowledge that most of us are unaware of it. To distinguish this kind of knowledge from our ordinary knowledge, he calls this kind of knowledge '*simple knowledge*'. Simple knowledge finds its meaning in comparison with '*compound knowledge*'. Our ordinary knowledge is compound knowledge; it means we know something and we are aware of our knowledge; on the contrary in simple knowledge, we know something but we are not aware of our knowledge.

'....knowledge like ignorance, [has two types], sometimes it is simple which means knowing something along with being unaware about that knowledge and confirmation of having such knowledge and sometimes it is compound which is knowing something with being aware of this knowledge' (18, P:v1, 116).

All human beings instinctively have a kind of simple knowledge about pure Being but most of them are not aware of it. Accordingly, every human being, has a kind of innate knowledge about pure Being as the foundation of all beings, and because in Mulla Sadra's philosophy this pure Being is the same as God , we can say all human beings has a kind of simple and innate knowledge about God as the source of all finite beings and this innate knowledge is the foundation of our ordinary knowledge what so ever it could be. In other word, without this kind of pre-understanding of pure Being any kind of knowledge about finite beings is not possible. Even our conceptual knowledge about Being itself depends on this kind of innate understanding of Being. This is the meaning of pre-epistemological transcendence of human being in Mulla Sadra's philosophy which exactly corresponds to the existential dependency of man as finite being to God as infinite Being.

In Mulla Sadra's philosophy, we can find another meaning of transcendence, that in western thought it has been neglected, this new meaning of transcendence which we call it post-epistemological transcendence likewise the previous meaning just belongs to human being and no other entity shares with him in this kind of transcendence. Mulla Sadra believes that human being on the contrary to other beings, does not have any definite and specified grade in the hierarchy of being (18, v8, P:343). Man can ascend or descend in this hierarchy. In his theory of substantial motion he emphasizes more on this characteristic of man and distinguishes man from other beings in this characteristic by Its free will. In other word, although substantial motion in general belongs to all entities in this sensible world, there is a kind of substantial motion which is peculiar to man. In this kind of motion man can define his place in the hierarchy of being by his free will. Man can change his being by his free will. Diametrically opposed to all other beings, human being can completely change his essence by the

choices he makes. It is a dynamic being and not just a solid and static being (18, v9, P: 20).

Hitherto, there is no difference between Mulla Sadra and Heidegger; because Heidegger again believes that Dasein can make his essence by his choices. Heidegger like other existentialist philosophers believes in priority of existence over essence in human being. But what makes Mulla Sadra different from Heidegger and other existentialist philosophers is that he thinks of human knowledge as a kind of substantial motion. In his theory of knowledge he introduces an innovative idea which is called the ‘the union of intellect with intelligible’ or ‘the union of knower with known’ in his theory of knowledge he proves that, in every kind of knowing there should be a kind of union between knower and known; without this union any kind of knowledge wont be possible. This union, he attests, is not essential but it is an existential union;(18, v3, 312-321) it means that in knowing knower and known are existentially united and this happens in every level of knowledge from sensory to imaginal and finally intellectual knowledge. So in every kind of knowledge because of this union between knower and known there happens a kind of substantial and existential motion for knower, and his being extends beyond what it has been (Ibid, P:325). And this is exactly the meaning of post-epistemological transcendence in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, a kind of transcendence that Heidegger philosophy easily neglects it.

4. Conclusion

As we discussed above, human being differs from other beings in its transcendental structure; no other entity shares with man in this intrinsic characteristic. Both Heidegger and Mulla Sadra believe in this fact and emphasize on that in their philosophy and again both of them try to find the root of this transcendental structure. However, while Heidegger tries to find the roots of this transcendence in the existence of man alone and does not look at transcendence as a relational fact. Mulla Sadra interprets this transcendence which is the very essence of man as a relational fact. It means, because man as a finite being is existentially dependent on pure and infinite Being, all of its existential attributes find their meaning in the light of this dependency. For Mulla Sadra, human

transcendence is another side of its dependency on pure being, but Heidegger on the other hand looks at this transcendence as mere independent attribute of man and its proper existence. That's why for Heidegger transcendence does not have another side and its root are only found in the proper existence of man or as he calls it, Dasein. So for Heidegger this transcendence is just the openness of Dasein to beings and Being itself and this openness is the foundation of human knowledge. Consequently, Heideggerian transcendence is just pre-epistemological transcendence and not more. On the other hand, for Mulla Sadra transcendence has other aspects and dimensions. In his philosophy transcendence has three dimensions all of them raised from a common root. These three dimensions are existential, pre-epistemological and post epistemological that are rooted in the dependency of man as a finite being on infinite and absolute Being which is the very same as God.

As we discussed above, even the pre-epistemological transcendence of man which is the foundation of our a priori synthetic knowledge as Heidegger believes in his interpretation on Kant, has its root in the existential dependency of man as finite being on pure and infinite being, this is exactly what we can infer from Mulla Sadra's philosophy. The foundation of our a priori knowledge is the relational and dependent structure of man. Man has a priori knowledge because it is pre-epistemologically and existentially dependent to the foundation and source of all being. This result as we believe can open a new horizon on the future comparative studies in Islamic and western philosophy and can be a new step in this field.

Notes

1- This article has been extracted from a doctoral thesis titled "Existential Explication of Knowledge in Mulla Sadra and Heidegger's Philosophy" By: Hossein Zamaniha under the supervision of Dr. Reza Akbarian.

2- In this article, following Heidegger's method, we intentionally use Being with capital B, for referring to being itself or pure being.

3- Heidegger coined this term for calling man. He intentionally uses this word with capital 'D'. In this article we follow this method and use

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Dasein with capital “D” even if it does not occur at the beginning of sentence.

4- For Kant transcendental is more epistemological than being ontological while Heidegger tries to give a pre-ontological and pre-epistemological aspect to the notion.

5- “Fundamental Ontology” is a new research area established by Heidegger to research about possibility of any ontology . In this field, Heidegger answering the question of the possibility of ontology explicates existential structure of human being (9, 35).

6- also cf. (4, 392-406).

7- For more information about Heidegger’s interpretation on Kant’s philosophy refer to 1 and 24.

8- Some of the new interpreters of Mulla Sadra’ s philosophy such as, for example Seyyed Hossein Nasr and his students use “transcendental theosophy” for calling Mulla Sadra’ s philosophy but we think this is not an adequate usage and we prefer using “transcendental philosophy” instead.

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